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SUMMARY
The judicial doctrine of jurisprudence constante is a civil-law equivalent of the common law 
doctrine of stare decisis. Both doctrines resulted from the 19th-century legal positivist movement 
criticizing the liberty of courts when deciding like cases. If stare decisis has developed into a nor-
matively serious doctrine ensuring coherent and consistent adjudication, jurisprudence constante, 
however, did not go that far. After a short historical introduction regarding the development of both 
doctrines, this paper discusses their most important normative differences, provides reasons for these 
differences, and analyzes the problems that the civil-law doctrine presents in the Slovene legal system 
in particular, the possibility of transplanting the common law doctrine to our country, and the need 
for a third way approach to better ensure uniform case law in Slovenia.
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INTRODUCTION
Particularly in modern complex societies, uniform case law is of great im-
portance in order for the constitutional principles of the rule of law and equality 
before to be seriously taken into consideration. Legal families and the legal systems 
within them have differently dealt with these issues, although nowadays from a first 
impression it seems that the approaches from common law and civil law to the 
legal institution of “precedent” are not that far from themselves when we consider 
the broadest meaning of that word. However, when we go into the details of how 
seriously precedents are followed we soon notice important differences. Thus 
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the main idea of this paper is to analyze some of the most important differences 
between the common law doctrine of stare decisis and the civil law doctrine of 
jurisprudence constant and discuss advantages and disadvantages of both doctrines. 
As a matter of fact, there is more about the deficiencies of the civil law doctrine, as 
I claim here as well as in my other works on this topic that stare decisis is a better 
and more efficient doctrine.
In the paper, I present some of the most important steps in the historical devel-
opment of both doctrines, mostly in England and France. Then I discuss the different 
constitutional entrenchment of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. In the 
next part many problems with the civil law doctrine in the Republic of Slovenia 
are presented including the reforms that have already been made to improve the 
situation and those that have still been envisaged. At the end of this part, just before 
the conclusion of the paper, I also discuss some of the ideas of how to depart from 
the predominantly unsuccessful civil doctrine and come closer to stare decisis, but 
in a quite distinct civilian way. 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINES
The concept of jurisprudence constante has generally been used in a global 
literature when the civilian approach to considering previous typical (or model) 
judicial decisions in future cases (judicial “precedents”) is distinguished from the 
common law approach. As a matter of fact it is a French expression which designates 
settled or established case-law (i.e. one of the meanings of jurisprudence is case 
law, and constante means constant, settled, established). In the mentioned literature 
it has become a generally accepted term for a series of judicial decisions in which 
courts adhere to a legal position that was taken in a previous case1.
Historically, the civil-law tradition has recognized statute as the primary source 
of law. It was France which had first adopted modern codifications (five of them), 
and where it was explicitly prohibited to use judicial precedents as judges had 
been doomed to only be mouthpieces of the law. Already to Montesquieu, it was 
the power of the legislature to make law and every judge was supposed to only 
be bouche de la loi2. In his famous work Montesquieu expressed the problems of 
his time so, from a normative perspective, he envisaged a solution. Thereafter his 
“spirit of the law” of a strict conception of the separation of powers was kept all 
the way through the Revolution due to general distrust of parlements (the then 
royal courts) that were manipulated by the French king before the revolution. Not 
only in France, but elsewhere in the then Europe, the ideals of certainty and com-
1 In Germany this doctrine is, e.g., called ständige Rechtsprechung.
2 C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Ontario 2001.
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pleteness in the law implied that legislative provisions had to be formulated and 
interpreted as mathematical canons to avoid any room for discretion or arbitrary 
decisions by the judges”3.
However, in the course of the 19th century, this “enlightened” illusion that the 
legislature is capable of regulating everything important and judges need only to me-
chanically apply the legal rule to the facts of a case was relaxed to some extent. Thus, 
as memories of the abuses of the pre-revolution regimes began to fade, ideological 
concerns over the judiciary’s role were assuaged. In their own judicial practices, civil 
law jurisdictions gradually adhered to a system of informal precedent law, where 
a sequence of analogous cases acquired persuasive force as a source of law4. After all, 
equality before the law required some coherence and consistency otherwise the free-
dom of courts to decide like cases differently at their pure will would be intolerable.
At the same time, when the first civil codifications were being prepared on the 
European continent, also England could not escape a legal positivist movement 
that began to criticize “arbitrary” judiciary of the Middle Ages. That state of mind 
produced a reform from which two important doctrines were born: stare decisis (et 
non quita movere) and ratio decidendi. The idea of the first is that judges should 
stick to a position that they took in a previous case with the same legal question 
resolved and essentially similar facts present. The second brought the first even 
further and was its extension: it was not enough to follow a previous pattern case 
(precedent) but what was from then on considered binding from such a precedent 
was only that part of the case that was a subject of decision (including the decision 
and the essential facts of the case). This stemmed from the critique that common law 
judges had previously followed a “spirit” of the case5, not the “latter” of the same6.
As an important intellectual figure behind that reform movement in England 
was J. Bentham, who was known to be very critical about common law judges. 
Already in 1776, he published anonymously a vehement attack upon Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (the most famous book about common law ever) and his interpre-
tation of natural law. Also, he firmly maintained the desirability of the codification 
of the law in England, to help it escape from the arbitrariness of the judiciary, to 
clarify what law was, and to make it enforceable justly, in the sense that all men 
could know what its provisions were. He seems to have invented the very term 
‘codification’ to describe the process of issuing a code7.
3 V. Fon, F. Parisi, Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis, “International 
Review of Law and Economics” 2006, No. 26, pp. 519–535.
4 Ibidem.
5 K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An Introduction of Comparative Law, Oxford 1998.
6 M. Novak, Limiting Courts: Towards Greater Consistency of Adjudication in the Civil Law 
System, [in:] Logic, Argumentation and Interpretation, ed. J. Aguiló-Regla, Stuttgart 2007, pp. 95–106.
7 O.F. Robinson, T.D. Fergus, W.M. Gordon, European Legal History, London 2000, pp. 254–
255. We also know that he even offered to help codify laws of the newly independent United States of 
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THE TWO DOCTRINES’ DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENTRENCHMENTS
If we compare the two doctrines, namely jurisprudence constant and stare 
decisis, we must realize that the common law’s version is stronger constitutionally 
entrenched than the civil law’s counterpart. Stare decisis is not only considered 
as a part of but is almost synonymous with the rule of law stemming from the 
idea that if we follow previous model cases (i.e. legal precedents) the values of 
stability, predictability, certainty, and trust in the law are thereby ensured8. The 
rule of law as an idea is, in sensu lato, certainly a meta-legal value, a Grundnorm 
or a constitution itself.
Unlike common law, in civil law systems jurisprudence constante is usually 
understood as being constitutionally entrenched in articles dealing with the equal-
ity of law9. As a constitutional principle equality of law is also one of the pillars 
of modern constitutional systems, at least the ones from the times of bourgeois 
revolutions onwards. In many contemporary constitutions’ texts equality of law 
comes after the rule of law, in some sense, it is derived from the rule of law as 
being the law itself.
The fact that the common law doctrine of stare decisis is stronger constitu-
tionally entrenched than the civil law doctrine of jurisprudence constante is not 
surprising if we know the tradition and historical importance of judges, courts, 
and their case law in the legal consciousness of people in common law countries. 
Despite the globalization also in the area of law and some ideas on the legal aca- 
demic market maintaining that the two greatest legal families have slowly been 
merging, it seems that at least in the aspect that I am dealing with here important 
differences between the two mentioned doctrines as applied in the two legal fam-
ilies still remain.
America in the 18th century as he proposed to the then President Madison to write codification for the 
United States. See: R. David, G. Grasmann, Einführung in die groβen Rechtssysteme der Gegenwart, 
München 1988.
8 The use of precedent is in the common law world generally justified by the following elements: 
predictability, reliability, equality, and efficiency. Moreover, it also helps harmonize and reconcile 
two ideals: stability and change. H. Abadinsky, Law and Justice: An Introduction to the American 
Legal System, New Jersey 2003, p. 37.
9 The Slovene Constitutional Court found it as being part of Article 22 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Slovenia (Off. Gaz. RS, No. 33/91-I et seq.; for an English translation of the Constitution 
visit the official webside of the Constitutional Court at: www.us-rs.si) dealing with the right to the 
equal protection of right, stipulating the following: “Everyone shall be guaranteed equal protection of 
rights in any proceeding before a court and before other state authorities, local community authorities, 
and bearers of public authority that decide on his rights, duties, or legal interests”. This constitutional 
right is considered to be derived from the constitutional principle of equality before the law from 
Article 14 of the Constitution.
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What do I mean by saying that the stare decisis doctrine is “normatively strong-
er” than its civil law’s counterpart? I refer to its direct (or immediate) and erga 
omnes effects in the sense of its binding character, meaning that a typical or model 
previous decision of a higher court should in every essentially similar (in terms of 
the decision and the material facts of a case) subsequent case be followed by all 
inferior courts in the same jurisdiction as well as by the higher court that produced 
such a precedent decision. Certainly, in cases with different decisions and different 
material facts courts do not need to follow precedent decisions. Moreover, the higher 
court may depart from its precedent if it finds better reasons or social circumstances 
on the basis of which the case was decided before have changed.
Contrary to that, when the civil-law doctrine is considered, only a series of 
cases that were decided essentially similar constitutes settled or established case 
(i.e. constant jurisprudence) law that obliges future courts, in one way or another, 
to follow it. What distinguish it from the common-law doctrine are basically two 
issues that make it normatively weaker when compared with stare decisis: (1) no 
immediate or direct effect because it usually takes at least several cases10 before the 
case-law settles; and (2) weaker erga omnes effects to the effect that future courts 
officially recognizing only inter partes effects of judicial decisions do not always 
follow precedents consistently in future situations11.
But still, even in the framework of civil-law legal systems, jurisprudence con-
stante contains certain elements resembling stare decisis in terms of their normative 
dimensions. There are certain instances of powers of civil-law courts that entail 
(i) direct and (ii) erga omnes legal effects of a single judicial decision. The first 
example is the power of constitutional review of constitutional courts or similar 
courts with a power to strike down a piece of legislation. In such a case only one 
decision is needed to have direct and erga omnes effect – in a similar manner as 
amending a statute through legislative procedure. The second example is a decision 
or opinion of the Court of Justice of the EU in the cases of preliminary rulings. It 
is a decision that has a direct binding effect and applies to virtually anyone (erga 
omnes) within the EU when it comes to the interpretation of an EU law provision.
In Slovenia as a civil-law country, as already hinted, the constant jurispru-
dence doctrine applies, which is one of the reasons why it faces many problems 
concerning the uniformity of case law. However, it seems that even if the common 
law doctrine is at some point transplanted to our country, which is quite unlikely 
for various reasons, it would not be an ultimate cure for all the ailments associated 
with the non-uniform case law. I discuss some of these issues in the following part.
10 In Slovenia at least three cases according to the established position of the Constitutional Court.
11 In Slovenia courts most often do not recognize case law as formally for future cases and even 
Constitutional Court decisions in consitutional-complaint cases, which thus deal with violations of 
individuals’ fundamental rights, are often not considered as binding erga omnes.
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SLOVENIA: THE NEED FOR A THIRD APPROACH
When Slovenia and its legal system are concerned, it will follow below that 
the present situation of how our version of established case law works in practice 
to ensure the case law’s coherence, consistency, equality before the law, and con-
sequently rule of law, is far from ideal. Thus it seems more than necessary that it 
should be reformed. But in which direction?
Should we only upgrade the existing concept of jurisprudence constante with 
some kind of variants that would consider incorporating some stronger normative 
elements to make the doctrine more in tune with the principles of equality before 
the law and legal certainty? Or should we abandon the civil-law doctrine altogether 
and try to assume a kind of the common law version? Or, if the last idea would be 
too revolutionary to be interesting for a relatively stable political and legal system, 
if would be better to invent some new or third approach?
In this light, I first discuss potential variants of the existing system, and then, 
second, think about a third approach, taking into consideration that a complete 
incorporation of stare decisis into a civil-law legal system would be a too radical 
idea at present.
1. Variants of jurisprudence constante
The jurisprudence constante doctrine existed in Slovenia before and also 
during the communism. Courts have generally adhered to it, but it is a question 
how consistently they were in that. At the beginning of this century, the Slovene 
Constitutional Court elevated this doctrine to the constitutional level linking it 
with the fundamental right of the Equal Protection of Rights under Article 22 of 
the Constitution12. Since then the requirement that constant jurisprudence must 
be followed was considered as a fundamental right of a procedural character in 
the sense that if a court does not follow established case-law, if there is one, and 
does not even mention such in the reasoning of its decision a party may claim 
a violation of this fundamental right, by a constitutional complaint, because that 
court obviously acted arbitrarily. That means that this approach is only procedural 
so it means that a court can make a different decision, that is, depart from such 
established case-law as long as it mentions that there was established case law 
and provides reasons for a different decision. This means that the Constitutional 
12 See supra. In this regard see, e.g., cases No. Up-121/96 dated 23 March 2000, Up-337/00 
dated 26 February 2002, Up-207/00 dated 24 February 2002, and Up-337/00 dated 26 February 
2002, at the official website of the Slovene Constitutional Court: www.us-rs.si. See also: M. Novak, 
Poglavja iz filozofije in teorije prava (Kultura precedensa), Nova Gorica 2008 (chapters: Philosophy 
and Theory of Law; Culture of Precedent), pp. 218–226.
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Court would not go into evaluating which court’s position is more correct from 
a substantive point of view.
Although the above-mentioned approach is a step forward to ensure uniform 
case law in Slovenia, it is still too weak a doctrine to solve the major problems 
concerning Slovene non-uniform case law. The Constitutional Court has basically 
established that constant jurisprudence is formed through a series of equal decisions 
considering that only two consequent equal decisions do not already constitute 
established case law. Thus, in this Article I, claim for a stronger approach, one that 
would be close to stare decisis, and would provide some solution to the problem 
of especially the horizontal concept of settled jurisprudence in Slovenia, which is 
a major problem. The vertical concept of settled jurisprudence entails that lower 
courts follow case law established by higher courts, which is more or less the case 
in Slovenia as there are rare departures from this doctrine by lower courts, but the 
gravest problem in Slovenia is that there are many different decisions in essential-
ly similar cases at the same level of courts (the so-called horizontal dimension of 
settled case law), which is intolerable.
According to the Slovene Courts Act13, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to 
ensure uniform case law. In order to ensure that two powers have been vested in it 
by legislation. The historically older one was the power to sit as a plenary and issue 
opinions of principle whenever they noticed some problems in terms of unsettled 
case-law. But there is problem with that power since the Supreme Court has not 
convened often for that reason, making this power quite inefficient in practice.
Another power that was vested in the Supreme Court several years ago, in 
order to better ensure uniform case law, was the possibility for it to admit revision 
(therefore “admitted revision”) as a so-called extraordinary legal remedy from 
appellate courts. If parties to appellate judicial proceedings establish that in their 
case the case law of the appellate courts is not uniform, which can be detrimental 
to their case, they can file such a revision to the Supreme Court to make such case 
law uniform through its decision. The very idea was fine and the case law was 
indeed made more uniform, through the application of that remedy by the parties, 
but the problem is that, not only at the Supreme Court as a whole but also at its 
(five) different departments, there are different panels within each of the department 
often with different positions and decisions in essentially similar cases.
In the area of civil procedure, by the recent amendment to the Civil Procedure 
Act14, the importance of the so-called admitted revision, considering the fact that 
the regular revision as an extraordinary remedy in civil cases over a certain amount 
of money was abolished, was even more emphasized in order to give the Supreme 
Court additional opportunities for making case law more uniform. Although the 
13 Off. Gaz RS, No. 19/94 et seq.
14 Off. Gaz. RS, No. 10/17.
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intention was positive, I am afraid that this additional effort will bring no better 
results for the above-mentioned reasons. Further, in my opinion, this amendment 
does not solve the problem because these revisions will be admitted by different 
panels of the Supreme Court that could still take decisions in essentially similar 
matters in an entirely different manner.
A similar problem concerning the divergent approach of different panels to same 
issues appears at courts of appeal in Slovenia. Although the country is being rather 
small and a unitary state, we have four appellate jurisdictions with four courts of 
appeal. This causes certain problems since regarding a same issue you often get 
different decisions even within one court of appeal, by different panels in their civil 
and criminal departments, without even mentioning the differences between the 
four appellate courts and their panels. There were some attempts through different 
ideas that the courts of appeal, or their departments, should organize joint meet-
ings in order to try to make their case law more uniform. These meetings actually 
occurred but not in a systematic and consistent manner. And it was held that such 
divergence of positions was not that much due to lack of information that other 
judges or panels would have considering previous typical decisions, but more to 
firm positions of individual judges that would not be quite ready to depart from 
even when faced with the different positions of other judges of the same level that 
took such prior to the first judges.
Even if Slovenia decided to adopt the stare decisis doctrine, which according 
to the above said is quite unlikely, it would not solve its problem concerning the 
horizontal aspect. The horizontal stare decisis thus entails that courts of the same 
level are not mutually bound by their precedents. This could be a particular problem 
if in a jurisdiction there are several such courts that are often unwilling to cooper-
ate. Although this could also be a problem in common law countries where stare 
decisis formally applies, it is a greater problem for a small size country such as 
Slovenia, which has four different courts of appeal. Thus potentially we can have 
four different decisions from these courts, and even every such court has several 
panels that can come to different decisions. That situation can also occur at the one 
Supreme Court, which incorporates several panels in its five departments.
In order to deal with such a problem, the Ministry of Justice in agreement with 
the Supreme Court has envisaged an amendment to the Courts Act15. The new idea 
that the Ministry is coming up with is the idea of “extended panels” of the Supreme 
Court. When deciding on a certain legal issue, if a single panel considers that such 
is important for ensuring uniform law application, it can decide that the case is to be 
decided by so-called “extended panel”. It would normally do that if the resolution of 
a legal issue might entail departure from the constant jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court or from a legal view of the extended panel, if the case law of the Supreme 
15 The document is still an unofficial draft of that amendment.
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Court is not uniform in that area of law, or if the legal issue also falls within the 
power of deciding by another department of the Supreme Court, and if the prior 
attempt to coordinate and harmonize departments and the judges concerning the 
uniformity of case law was unsuccessful. The extended panel is to be composed of 
the judges of the deciding panel, five other judges and the president of the Supreme 
Court or his vice-president who presides over that panel. A viewpoint taken at such 
a panel is to be mandatory for all the panels of the Supreme Court.
2. Beyond jurisprudence constante
Frankly, the above said could solve some problems concerning non-uniform 
case law for Supreme Court panels but not for the panels of the courts of appeal if 
the case does not go all the way to the Supreme Court to establish case law in such 
a situation. Moreover, even Supreme Court judges would not be required to seek 
a decision by the extended panel, and I am sure there are other problems associated 
with this upgraded version of jurisprudence constante. The mentioned would be 
some improvement but the core problem would remain intact.
This is why, on the top of all the suggested ideas, it seems necessary that the 
Constitutional Court of Slovenia changes its interpretation of the constitutional 
clause of the Equal Protection of Rights, which as already mentioned includes some 
safeguards that constant jurisprudence will be adhered to. But it is completely help-
less when there is a case outside the ambit of this doctrine, and that would, e.g., be 
the case when a same court panel is allowed to make two different decisions in an 
essential similar situation without even mentioning the previous one (remember, for 
case law to be considered established we need at least two same decisions). That is 
not already constant jurisprudence and judges are fully allowed to do that. For me, 
this is unreasonable if not unconstitutional and calls for a stricter interpretation of 
the mentioned clause by the Constitutional Court. I can understand that individual 
judges are horizontally independent from their peers’ decisions, but what about the 
parties: is it right that they remain to endure the instances of completely different 
decisions by a court panel in two essentially similar cases. There needs to be a legal 
remedy to prevent such that parties could resort to in such situation in which they 
can claim a violation of the Constitution. That would give the parties an efficient 
remedy against “stubborn” and too individualistic judges.
Such a turn in considering the role of constant jurisprudence would certainly 
require constitutional legitimacy that needs to be made by the Constitutional Court. 
Does this mean introducing some kind of civil-law or human-rights stare decisis? 
Perhaps so but this is obviously very much needed at least in the Slovene legal 
system. In such a manner we will effectively solve the vertical problem of prece-
dents, which frankly is already not such a problem, but will also be important for 
solving the horizontal problem.
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To deal with the horizontal issue of precedent, it would be useful that we adopt 
some kind of a system of preliminary ruling taking example from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, which efficiently ensures uniform interpretation 
of EU law in member states. For example, if any judge faces a previous decision 
of any of his colleagues at the same level (considering the fact that they already 
follow precedents of higher courts and that this is not disputable as a matter of 
argument of authority) in a similar case and wants to make a different decision he 
or she would need to adjourn the proceedings, and submit the case to the already 
mentioned extended panel of the Supreme Court to take a decision and in such 
a manner decides which position is more acceptable.
CONCLUSIONS
From what was said above it is easy to conclude that when it comes to the 
coherence and consistency16 of case law as a basic requirement of the two consti-
tutional principles mentioned above, namely the rule of law and the equality before 
the law, it is clear that the stare decisis doctrine is better off than jurisprudence 
constante. I guess not many jurists are quite happy in the civil-law world with 
case-law coherence.
Requiring courts to more thoroughly follow previous typical cases is to restrain 
their freedom to decide all cases anew. That might entail limiting their freedom (or 
independence) but if they more follow model decisions the coherence of their work 
would be improved, and thereby the entire institution of judiciary would benefit17.
My opinion is that an additional approach towards accepting some kind of 
stare decisis in the framework of civil law should be made, in order to solve the 
problems of a low level of case-law coherence and consistency that jurisprudence 
constante entails. For that reason, I suggested above a civil-law version that would 
help with the problem of the horizontal effects of precedents as well. A potential 
strengthen reliance on stare decisis in the civil-law world would not be an entirely 
new “battle”, as I mentioned earlier some elements of stare decisis are already 
there, which had been fought for by constitutional courts and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in the second part of the previous century18.
16 Both coherence and consistency were claimed by N. MacCormick to be important principles 
within his idea of the second-order justification of judicial decisions. N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning 
and Legal Theory, Oxford 1994, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198763840.001.0001, 
p. 119.
17 For more of that view, see: M. Novak, Limiting Courts…
18 See: idem, The Promising Gift of Precedents, [in:] Systems of Justice in Transition: Central 
European Experiences since 1989, eds. J. Přibáň, P. Roberts, J. Young, Aldershot 2003, pp. 94–108.
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Contrary to certain academic colleagues from the civil-law legal family, I am 
not that pessimistic about the possibility of development of a kind of the stare 
decisis doctrine in our legal family. If one doctrine is better working in practice 
why not try to apply it. I am aware of the fact that legal transplanting19 could be 
useless20 or even dangerous sometimes but there are also positive stories about that. 
One of them is certainly the legal transplant of ‘plea bargaining’ in criminal law 
from the accusatorial procedure to the inquisitorial (or at least nowadays mixed) 
procedure in a civil-law country as Slovenia. At some point, it was unthinkable that 
such a technique of “negotiation”, originating from the general ideal that even in 
criminal procedure it is about resolving a conflict or dispute between the defendant 
and the state, would be relevant in continental criminal procedure that was found in 
the inquisitorial principle of seeking material truth. However, at least in Slovenia it 
was a success although there are still some legal issues to be dealt with, but about 
50% of overall criminal cases are resolved in such a manner, which very much 
contributed to reducing court delays in the area of criminal law.
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STRESZCZENIE
Doktryna prawna utrwalonego orzecznictwa (jurisprudence constante) jest cywilno-prawnym 
ekwiwalentem doktryny stare decisis w porządku prawnym common law. Obydwie narodziły się 
z XIX-wiecznego ruchu pozytywistycznego krytykującego swobodę sądownictwa w przypadku 
wydawania orzeczeń precedensowych. O ile stare decisis rozwinęła się w normatywnie ważką 
doktrynę, zapewniającą spójne i konsekwentne orzecznictwo, o tyle jurisprudence constante nie 
rozwinęła się w takim stopniu. W niniejszym artykule omówiono, po krótkim historycznym wstępie 
dotyczącym rozwoju obu doktryn, ich najbardziej istotne różnice pod względem normatywnym, 
wskazując zarazem ich przyczyny. Ponadto przeanalizowano problemy doktryny cywilno-prawnej, 
w szczególności w słoweńskim systemie prawnym, jak również możliwość przeniesienia doktryny 
na gruncie common law do Słowenii oraz potrzebę wdrożenia trzeciego, alternatywnego, podejścia 
w celu zapewnienia jednolitości prawa precedensu w tym kraju.
Słowa kluczowe: Słowenia; prawo precedensu; orzecznictwo utrwalone (jurisprudence constante); 
stare decisis; trzecie ujęcie
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